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ABSTRACT
During the first six months of 1989 U.s. corporations acquired over $19
billion of their own stock to establish employer stock ownership plans
(ESOPs). We evaluate the common claims that there exist unique tax and
incentive contracting advantages to establishing ESOPs. Our analysis suggests
that, particularly for large firms, where the greatest growth in ESOPs has
occurred, the case is very weak for taxes being the primary motivation to
establish an ESOP. The case is also weak for employee incentives being the
driving force behind their establishment. We conclude that the main
motivation for the growth of E5OPs is their anti-takeover characteristics.
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Stanford, CA 94305During the first six months of 1989 U.S. corporations acquired over $19
billion of their own stock to establish employer stock ownership plans
(ESOPs). This compares to only $5.6 billion for all of 1988 and less than $1.5
billion per year from the passage of the Employee Retirement Security Act in
1974 through 1987.1Special tax advantages appear to be available to
companies using ESOPs. For example, such firms can sometimes deduct
dividends paid on ESOP shares as well as benefit from a tax-subsidized
borrowing rate on loans used to buy ESOP shares. There are also importaiit
nontax considerations such as the claimed incentive advantages of employees
owning company stock and the use of ESOPs to defend against hostile tender
offers by placing shares in the hands of relatively friendly employees. Our
analysis brings into question the notion that ESOPs provide unique tax and
incentive advantages. Depending on the benchmark against which they are
compared ESOPs can often be beaten along both dimensions.
Our analysis suggests that, particularly for large firms, where the
greatest growth in ESOPs has occurred, the case is very weak for taxes being
the primary motivation to establish an ESOP. Yet Congress appears to believe
that tax benefits explain the growth in popularity of ESOPs over the last few
years. In July, 1989, proposed legislation in H.R. 2572 would result in the
elimination of both the dividend deduction and the interest subsidy for plans
established after July 10, 1989. The case is also weak for employee incentives
being the driving force behind the establishment of ESOPs. We conclude that
the main motivation for the growth of ESOPs is their anti-takeover
characteristics.
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin with an overview of tax and
nontax motivations for adopting ESOPs. This is followed by a closer look at
the operational characteristics of ESOPs. Our discussion here includes an
evaluation of the risk-sharing and incentive features of these plans. We turn
next to a closer look at some of their alleged tax advantages. Finally, we
present some evidence on the growing importance of ESOPs in the U.S. and
conclude with some brief summary remarks.
I. Overview of Tax and Nontax Motivations for Adopting ESOPs.
The ESOP is a special type of defined contribution plan (like an
individual retirement account, a Keogh account, or a Code Sec. 401(k) pension
plan). The corporation makes tax deductible annual contributions to the
ESOP and the contributions are generally used to buy company stock or to pay
down a loan that that was used to acquire company stock when the program
was initiated. Employees are allocated company shares each year tax free and
any investment income accumulates tax free within the ESOP. Employees
pay tax when they receive dividend distributions on ESOP shares during their
1flensionsand Investment Age Magazine. July 24, 1989, and BIasi (1988).
Iworking lives or other distributions from the ESOP during retirement or
when they otherwise leave the firm.
Unlike most other defined contribution plans, the ESOI' is required to
invest primarily in the stock of the company establishing the plan, and this is
commonly taken to mean that the ESOP must hold at least fifty percent of its
assets in the stock of th,e sponsoring company. Unlike any other defined
contribution plan, the ESOP can borrow to buy company stock, to prefund the
required number of shares that the firm expects to credit to its employees over
the life of the plan. Such plans are called "leveraged ESOPs." As the firm
contributes to the ESOP, shares are credited to employees' accounts.
Moreover, qualified lenders can exclude 50% of the interest that they receive
on the ESOP loan and the corporation can deduct any dividends that are used
to pay down the ESOP loan or are paid directly to employees on their ESOP
shares. As we will see, these tax benefits must be balanced against both tax
and nontax costs of establishing an ESOP.
ESOPs have become popular in recent years because (1) there are
several important tax benefits that are available through an ESOP that are not
available through other tax-qualified and nonqualified compensation
programs, (2) they can be used to restructure employee work incentives and
retirement benefits, and (3) they can be used in corporate finance strategies as
substitutes for, or in conjunction with, recapitalizations (changes in corporate
capital structures) and leveraged buyouts. For example, ESOPs have been
used to sell company divisions to employees. In addition, the deductibility of
net operating losses (both existing and so-called "built-in losses") against
future taxable income are not restricted if a corporate control change occurs
through ownership interests acquired by an ESOP. The 1986 Act restricted the
deductibility of such losses upon certain control changes when ownership
interests are sold to parties other than ESOPs. Moreover, ESOPs have been
used to secure tax deductions on the payment of dividends, to achieve a
subsidized borrowing rate on ESOP loans, and to defer the capital gains tax
incurred by owners of private companies on the sale of their shares to the
ESOP. ESOPs have also been tised to allocate interest payments domestically
to free up foreign tax credit limitations. The 1986 Act made foreign tax credit
limitations a significantly greater concern than it had been previously. The
U.S. restricts foreign tax credits to an amount equal to foreign taxable income
divided by worldwide taxable income, multiplied by U.S. tax on worldwide
taxable income. One way to mitigate this problem is to make foreign-source
income, as a fraction of worldwide income, as large as possible. Under Code
Sec. 861, interest generated on domestic debt must typically be allocated
partially to foreign activities, thereby reducing foreign-source income. It
appears possible to allocate 100% of the interest on certain ESOP debt to
domestic income, thereby increasing the allowable foreign tax credits.
2There are other nontax reasons why ESOPs have become popular. An
important one is that they have been used effectively to thwart hostile
takeover attempts, particularly in the state of Delaware.2 In early 1989,
Polaroid won an important decision in the Delaware Chancery Court, which
upheld Polaroid's issuance of 14% of its stock to an ESOP. prior to the
initiation of a hostile tender offer by Shamrock Holdings. The ESOP helped
Polaroid's management defeat Shamrock's bid for its stock because employees
voted their Polaroid shares with management. Deleware law requires that a
firm wait three years after it acquires a 15% interest in a target before it can
merge with the target unless it can secure an 85% vote of the target's
shareholders.3 The waiting period can impose substantial costs on the
acquiring firm if it had plans to use the assets of the target as collateral for
interim or longer-term loans to finance a leveraged buyout.Firm
management might establish an ESOP because they believe that employee-
shareholders are more likely to vote with them than are outside
shareholders. As a result, Polaroid's use of an ESOP as a successful takeover
defense stimulated considerable interest in ESOPs.
It is interesting to note that the New York Stock Exchange. requires
shareholder approval for adoption of an ESOP only when ESOPs acquire
more than 18.5% of employer stock.4 In addition, while employees must be
granted voting rights in public-company ESOPs, acting on a tender offer is not
a voting rights issue, so an ESOP provides a particularly strong tender offer
defense. With respect to the Delaware 85% rule, however, stock held by an
ESOP is counted as outstanding shares only if the participants have the right
to tender their shares confidentially.
ESOPs are also being used to replace existing defined-benefit pension
programs, to replace other types of defined contribution programs, and to
replace post-retirement health care programs. In the case of post-retirement
health care programs, some corporations are substituting an ESOP for their
previous promise to fund the post-retirement health care costs of their
employees.5 Most post-retirement health-care programs are unfunded and
are open-ended as to medical costs. In other words, the corporation makes an
unsecured promise to provide health care for employees after they retire,
whatever the costs might be. As an alternative, some companies contribute
their stock to an ESOP and employees fund their own post-retirement health
care costs from their accumulation in the ESOP. By establishing an ESOP, the
corporation transfers both the uncertainty of future health costs and the
2According to theWall Street Journal(4/5/89),179,000 companies areincorporated in
Delaware, including56% ofthe Fortune500 and 45% ofNew York Stock Exchangecompanies. 3Thethree-year waiting period also does not apply if the boardofdirectorsandtwo-thirdsof
thedisinterestedstockholdersvote in favor of the merger.
4Bader and Hourihan(1989b).
Examples include Ralston Purina, Boise Cascade, and Whitman. (Business Week, May 15,
1989).
3selection of the level of health care to employees.6 But the advance funding
of post-retirement benefits through an ESOP (or any other pension fund)
reduces the risk that the employer will default on the promise to provide the
future benefits.
As pointed out by Freiman (1989), however, advance funding of retiree
medical benefits through an ESOP is not necessarily tax advantageous. While
the employer secures an immediate tax deduction for the contribution into
the pension trust, employees eventually pay tax on withdrawals from the
fund. By contrast, pay-as-you-go retiree medical benefit plans allow
employees to receive tax-free benefits in retirement, but at the expense of a
deferred tax deduction for the employer and the loss of tax-free compounding
for advance funding. Section 401(h) plans allow the firm to have the benefits
both ways: immediate deduction for advance funding and tax-free
compounding of investment returns, along with tax-free benefits to retirees.
But it is not yet clear whether these benefits are available to defined
contribution pension plans, and no more than 25% of a pension plan's
contributions can be invested in a tax-exempt account to be used to provide
for tax-free health care benefits.
That advance funding of retiree medical benefits through an ESOP may
be dominated along the tax dimension by other funding alternatives is
interesting because it increases the likelihood that nontax factors, such as an
enhanced takeover defense, have a first order effect on the decision to fund
such benefits through an ESOP. Since tax considerations are reasonably
complicated in the pension area, in general, and in the ESOP area in
particular, it is important that both independent members of corporate
boards, as well as the courts, understand whether there really exist tax benefits
for proposed retirement benefit plans, because the adoption of such plans may
serve the interests of incumbent management, but not shareholders, along
nontax dimensions.
There are many substitute vehicles through which the corporation can
achieve the many nontax and tax benefits of ESOPs listed above. However,
there are some special tax benefits available to an ESOP that are not available
elsewhere. For example, an ESOP can borrow to finance its purchase of
company stock at a tax-subsidized rate and deduct the interest on the loan.
No other pension plan can do this. Moreover, a corporation can take a
deduction for dividends it pays on the stock held in the ESOP if the dividends
are paid directly to the employees in cash or if the dividends are used to pay
6This is not to say that the bargainisone-sided. It may be that thc corporation contributes
more to the ESOI'thanthe employee gives up in future health-care protection to compensate
the employee for bearing the risk of unexpected changes in the cost of health care. On the other
hand, employees mightmanagehealth care costs more efficiently when they are responsible
for the costs.
4down part of an ESOP loan. The ability to deduct from corporate taxable
income both dividends on ESOP shares and the interest payments on the
ESOP loan enables part of corporate income to avoid an entity-level tax, as in
S corporations, partnerships, and proprietorships.This has become
particularly important with the passage of the 1981 and 1986 Tax Act.
The tax laws in the U.S. have always treated debt (and other claims that
give rise to tax deductible payments to the corporation such as obligations to
employees, lessors, and suppliers) differently from corporate equities.
Whereas interest paid on debt is tax-deductible to corporate borrowers,
dividends paid on common and preferred stock are not. In addition, whereas
gains and losses on the repurchase of corporate bonds are taxable events to
corporate issuers, the same is not true of share repurchases. On the investor
side, interest from bonds is taxable as ordinary income whether paid out
currently or not, while dividends and changes in the value of stocks are
taxable only when realized.Moreover, dividends receive tax-favored
treatment .to corporate shareholders, and capital gains, besides being granted
favorable tax-deferral treatment, have also been taxed at rates well below that
of ordinary income to many shareholders.
Since the returns to corporate stock are tax-favored relative to bonds,
investors are willing to accept lower pre-tax equity returns, on a risk-adjusted
basis, to invest in them. This is similar to what we observe in the market for
tax-exempt bonds, where the pre-tax yields are substantially below those of
fully-taxable bonds. The same can readily be observed in the market for
adjustable-rate preferred stocks, held almost exclusively by corporations for
whom the dividend income is largely tax exempt.. This reduction in rates
exacts an implicit tax from investors. Symmetrically, the rate reduction
represents an implicit tax subsidy to issuers of corporate stocks that
compensates, at least partially, for the nondeductibility of dividends.7
Note that holding everything else constant, increasing the tax rate to
investors on income from share ownership reduces the pre-tax wedge
between shares and bonds (and therefore reduces the implicit tax subsidy to
issuing shares). This makes stock more expensive for corporations to issue
relative to bonds. Similarly, increasing corporate tax rates relative to personal
tax rates favors corporate debt financing to the extent that such financing
moves taxable income from the corporate sector to the noncorporate sector.
Prior to 1981, top marginal tax rates in the corporate sector were well
below top marginal personal tax rates. Top personal rates were 70% from 1965
to 1981 whereas top corporate rates were in the 50% range. In the two decades
preceding 1965, top personal rates were in the 90% range. During this period
of time, top long-term capital gains rates to individuals ranged from 25% to
7Sce Stiglitz(1973), Miller (1977),Auerbach (1983),and Scholes and Wolfson(1987, 1990).
535%. Such a configuration of tax rates should have caused common stocks to
bear substantial implicit taxes, and corporate debt financing might not have
been the least bit tax-favored for many corporations during this period.
With the passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act in 1981, personal
tax rates were reduced dramatically while corporate rates were not. But at the
same time, capital gains rates were also slashed. Moreover, with interest rates
at record levels, the tax advantage of capital gain deferral was particularly
high at this time. With top personal tax rates set at a level just above top
corporate tax rates, the 1981 Tax Act began to move incentives in the direction
of increased corporate borrowing, although this effect was mitigated by the
reduction in capital gains tax rates and high interest rates. By 1984, interest
rates had subsided dramatically, reducing the tax-sheltered nature of common
stocks to some extent, and this further promoted debt financing over equity
financing by corporations.
As always, important nontax factors were also bearing on the corporate
financing decisions during the early 1980s. In particular, mature corporations
were discovering that it was efficient, from a corporate control standpoint, to
restructure by buying back equity with the proceeds of debt issues, thereby
committing to distribute "free cash flows' to investors through bond interest
and principal repayments.8 Moreover, increased reliance on strip financing
(where institutional investors acquire combinations of junior debt along with
equity and/or senior debt, to reduce conflicts of interest among classes of
investors) and the rise of active bondholders enabled more debt to be issued
without the prospect of incurring excessive deadweight restructuring and
bankruptcy costs in the event of default on corporate commitments to
creditors.9 But it does not seem appropriate to view these developments as
being completely independent of the evolution of the tax law. The tax law
may well have provided important incentives for the proliferation of these
institutional arrangements.
Corporate restructuring took a decided turn in 1984. Net new
borrowing by corporations exploded to nearly $160 billion a year during 1984-
1986 from $66 billion per year during 1978-1983. At the same time there was a
quantum leap in the magnitude of both share repurchases ($37 billion per
year 1984-1986 versus $5 billion per year 1978-1983) and other equity
retirements via corporate acquisitions ($75 billion per year 1984-1986, versus
$15 billion per year 1980_1983).10
8Jensen (1986).
9Jensen(1989).
10Federal Income Tax Aspects of Corporate Financial Structures (Joint Committee on Taxation).
January 18, 1989, Table I-A, I-B on pp. 8-9.
6The 1986 Tax Reform Act had an even more dramatic impact on
favoring corporate debt financing. Personal rates were reduced to a level well
below that on corporations (28% for wealthy individuals versus 34% for
corporations by 1988) and capital gains tax rates were increased dramatically.
This, in conjunction with relatively low interest rates, substantially reduces
the implicit tax on shares, thereby making equity financing a particularly
expensive way to finance corporate investment.
That debt financing has become more tax-favored with the 1981 and
1986 Tax Acts is closely related to noncorporate forms of organization
becoming more tax-favored relative to the corporate form. If all corporate
earnings before interest and taxes could be distributed to investors as interest
(or interest substitutes), the corporation, would essentially be converted to a
partnership for tax purposes. There would be no entity-level tax imposed on
the corporation,'1 and all owners would pay tax at the personal level on
interest income.12
There are many ways in which the firm can "lever up." One method
that has received considerable attention is leveraged buyouts or LBOs. Others
include (1) debt-for-equity swaps, (2) dividend-for-debt exchanges, (3) cash
redemption of stock financed with debt, (4) deferred compensation plans, (5)
partnership arrangements involving deferred payments, and (6) leveraged
ESOPs. All of these alternatives are limited in their ability to eliminate the
corporate-level tax. Although a 100%-employee-owned ESOP firm can pay
out all of its before-tax income in the form of compensation payments to
employees, or dividend payments on ESOP stock or interest payments on
ESOP loans, we will see that there are enough tax rule restrictions, natural
market frictions, or other nontax costs to prevent the elimination of the
entity-level tax.
II. A Coser Look at the Operational Characteristics of ESOPs
Contribution Limits
It is often claimed that an important tax advantage of an ESOP is that
the corporation can make tax-deductible contributions to fund it.This
advantage, however, is not unique to an ESOP. Contributions to other
pension plans are also tax deductible. In fact, so is straight salary.
Because employees can earn the before-tax rate of return on assets
invested in a pension plan, it is generally tax-advantageous to provide at least
11Thisignoresanycorporate "alternative minimum tax" that may be assessed.
12 Scholes and WolIson (1989) for further discussion of these issues.
.7a portion of compensation in the form of a pension.'3 An ESOP might be
more tax-advantageous than other types of pension plans if the corporation
can make more generous contributions to an ESOP than to these alternative
pension plans. But this is generally not the case. ESOP contributions, are
limited, as are other defined contribution plans, to twenty-five percent of
compensation.14
As a tax-qualified pension plan, an ESOP cannot discriminate in favor
of highly-compensated employees.'5 Therefore, it is difficult for senior
management to control a large fraction of the shares of an ESOP. Even if the
ESOP :ownsthe entire .company(as is true of AVIS Corp.), senior
management might find it difficult to control a large fraction of the
company's stock.16
131fthe before-tax rate of interest is Rb and the employee's marginaltaxrate today is tpo and
onretirement in nyears istpnthenfor each $1 of after-tax incomecontributed tothe pension
fundthe employee realizes a return of
Si (1+ RbY'fltpn). (l-t0)
If the'employee's marginal tax rate is expected to remain constant, she would prefer pension
over salary if the before-tax rates of return on assets invested in the pension plan were greater
than the after-tax rates of return from investing outside the pension plan. Even if the before-
tax rates of return were greater in the pension plan, the employee might prefer to invest outside
the pension plan if she expected her marginal tax rate to increase in the future or if she had
particularly strong demand for current consumption and her borrowing rate was high.
14An ESOP is defined in Code Section 4975 as a stock bonus plan (where contributions may be
discretionary or contingent on measures Of performance, like company profits), or as a
combination stock bonus plan and money purchase pension plan (where contributions are neither
discretionary nor conditioned on performance measures). If the ESOP is set up as a stock-bonus
plan only, annual contributions are limited to 15% of employee compensation. ESOPs that are a
combination of stock bonus and money purchase pension plans face annual contribution limits
equal to 25% of employee compensation.
This amount can not exceed $30,000 for any employee and only up to $200,000 of compensation is
taken into account in determining the percentage allocation to an employee. This $30,000 limit
will increase over time with inflation adjustments. That is, the maximum contribution must be
less than twenty-five percent of $90,000, indexed to inflation after 1986 once this amount
exceeds $30,000. In some cases employees can contribute more to an ESOP than to other defined
contribution programs. If less than one-third of the employees participating in the ESOP are
highly compensated, the limits can be increased.It is unlikely, however, that lowly-
compensated employees would want to contribute more than 25% of their salary to a defined
contribution plan due to a desire for current consumption.
15lndeed, because ESOPs cannot be integrated with social security benefits, while other plans
can be, ESOPs face tougher antidiscrimination rules.
16At least seventy percent of ESOP participants must be non-highly compensated employees.
The 1986 Tax Act defines 'highly compensated employee? as those who own 5% or more of the
company stock, those who earn more than $75,000 in compensation from the company, those who
earn over $50,000 and are in the top twenty percent of employee compensation in the
corporation, and officers whose compensation exceeds 150 percent of the contribution limit
8The 1986 Tax Act requires that employee participants inan ESOP be
100%-vested at the end of five years (cliff-vesting) or at least at the rate of 20%
for each year of employment after twoyears of employment with the firm. A
potential nontax cost of these vesting requirements is that withemployee
turnover, the remaining employees of the firm might receive an unintended
benefit. Indeed, remaining employees might have an incentiveto promote
employee turnover for this reason. An employee can factor expected
turnover into his calculations of the amount of currentcompensation that he
is willing to forgo for these expected future benefits. Because of bothrisk
aversion and imperfect information, however, he might bewilling to give up far less in current compensation than the cost of these benefitsto the
employer despite their tax-favored treatment.
Given these anti-discrimination funding requirements,many ESOPs
are funded with contribution percentages far less than the allowable 25% of
compensation. For example, Marsh and McAllister (1981) indicate that in
over 80% of the ESOP plans in firms with over 500 employees, contributions
to the ESOP amount to 10% or less of compensation. In a more recentstudy, Conte and Svejnar (1989) find that ESOP contributionsaverage 10% of salary
and wages.
The primary reason that these contributions are modest relativeto
contribution limits, despite the tax advantage of increasing contributionsand
reducing salary, is that the benefits are not valued highly by lower-level
employees. The main reason is that they have a relatively strong preference
for current over future consumption; they do not wish tosave 25% of their
compensation to secure future pension benefits, particularlyyoung employees. If the firm did contribute a large fraction of theircompensation
into an ESOP, such employees would be forced to borrowon personal account
each year to meet their current consumption needs. Given thedead-weight costs of originating and administering such a loan, alending institution
would require that the borrowing rate substantially exceed itslending rate,
even if the lender took into account the fact that an employee will realizea
future pension benefit that could be used topay off the loan.
Note that it is not possible to secure a loan with the futureproceeds of a
pension benefit without disqualifying the pension plan. Moreover, interest
incurred on debt to finance personalconsumption may be nondeductible.
Given these costs, many employees could not borrow at all, andothers might feel that they are still better off with currentsalary than with deferred ESOP
income. Although the corporation could still makepension contributions for
specified in theCode ($45,000as of January 1, 1987,01 1.5x$30,000). Union employees can be excludedfrom the £501' (and typically are if thecompany and the union bargain over contract
provisions such as salary, health, and retirement programs).
9these employees, a competitive labor market might force the firm to
supplement employee compensation if it is to retain the services of such
employees. This extra cost constrains the level of ESOP funding.
Prior to the 1986 Tax Act, the contribution limits were more generous
for a defined-benefit pension plan than for an ESOP. Generally, a defined-
benefit pension plan provides the participant with a retirement benefit that
depends on the level of final salary and/or the number of years of service.
Various funding rules allow the corporation to accelerate the funding of its
defined-benefit pension fund.This is not possible with a defined
contribution plan.
One motivation for overfunding a pension plan is that it enables the
corporate sponsor to earn the before-tax rate of return on its investment. The
corporation can reduce funding in later years to realize the benefit of
overfunding. With the 1986 and 1988 Tax Acts, it became less desirable as
well as more difficult to overfund defined-benefit pension plans. Moreover,
it now seems more likely that marginal tax rates will increase than decrease.
This further reduces the incentive to overfund. All else equal, it is preferable
to fund the pension plan when tax rates are high. As a result, defined
contribution pension plans have become more competitive with defined
benefit pension plans. This might be another reason why firms have
established ESOPs.
Some of the advantage of tax-free accumulation in an ESOP is lost,
however, since it is necessary for an ESOP to hold at least 50% of its assets in
its companys stock, and common stock is not the most tax-favored security to
hold in a pension fund. This may have been particularly so prior to the 1986
Tax Act. At that time, shares might have borne a high implicit tax as we
discussed earlier. That is, the before-tax rate of return on shares on a risk-
adjusted basis might have been far below the risk-adjusted returns on fully-
taxable bonds.
With the 1986 Tax Act, 100% of realized capital gains became taxable. In
addition, the corporate dividend-received deduction was reduced from 85% to
80% (and reduced further to 70% in many circumstances following passage of
the 1987 Act). As a result, the implicit tax on shares is likely to have fallen
and the required risk-adjusted before-tax rate on shares is likely to have
increased. This generally means that the tax penalty for holding company
stock in the pension plan has become smaller. This is another reason that
ESOPs might have become more popular after the 1986 Tax Act. Moreover,
contribution limits and anti-discrimination rules became more uniform
across different types of pension plans. Because these rules often represent
binding constraints, many corporations have substituted defined contribution
plans for their defined benefit plans. Defined contribution plans are simpler,
10less costly to operate, and less vulnerable to attack by the firmsmany constituents.
The 1986 Tax Act imposed an excise tax of 10% on the excess assets of a
terminated defined-benefit pension plan. This rate was increased to 15% with
the 1988 Tax Act. Prior to 1989, however, corporations were allowed to
transfer such excess assets to an ESOP without paying this excise tax. Merrill
Lynch, for example, established an ESOP on the termination of its defined
benefit pension plan in 1988.'
Risk-Sharing Considerations
ESOPs provide a form of employee ownership in the corporation. This
is an important reason why ESOPs have been championed by such members
of Congress as retired Senator Long. Employee stock ownership is presumed
to align the interests of the employee more closely with the overall goals of
the shareholders, relative to a pure salary contract. AVIS, which is 100%
owned by an ESOP, emphasizes employee ownership in advertisements. By
implication, customers are meant to feel that AVIS's employee-owners are
working harder to meet their needs.18
While employee ownership of shares may succeed in promoting a
commonality of interests between employees and owners relative to straight
salary contracts, it might be more efficient to provide these incentives in
alternative ways. Where employees are risk averse relative to shareholders,
efficient risk sharing requires that employees bear little risk of change in the
value of the firm. But where their activities affect the value of the firm, and
these actions are unobservable to shareholders except at prohibitive cost, it is
desirable to require employees to bear some risk of changes in the value of the
firm for incentive reasons. Risk averse employees will require additional
compensation, however, if they are exposed to risk that is beyond their
control. Efficient incentive contracting, therefore, requires a judicious trading
off of risk sharing and incentives.19
It is useful to think of stock prices as an indirect monitor of employee
inputs. The value of the firm can be viewed as being determined jointly by
employee actions and actions chosen by others such as competitors,
171n addition, Figgie International, Transco Energy, ENRON, andAshlandOil terminated
defined benefit pension plans and transferred the surplus to a company-sponsored ESOP.
18Avis claims that its customer complaints have dropped by 40% since its ESOPwas formed. It
also claims that its costs are now well below those of Hertz, its competitor, although Hertz's
costs used to be lower. There is conflicting evidence, however, as to whether ESOP plan
adoptions are associated with increased "productivity." For a discussion of the evidence see
Blasi (1988), Conte and Svejnar (1989), and Cooper (1989).
19 Holmstrom (1978)provides a particularly clear statement of the problem, as well as its
solution.
11customers, and Nature (that is, random factors). Oftentimes it is possible to
devise accounting measures of performance (e.g., divisional profits or
physical output measures) that serve as less "noisy" indirect monitors of
employee inputs. The reliance on such measures through incentive
compensation arrangements is often a more efficient way (relative to stock-
market-value-based measures) to align the interests of employees with those
of shareholders. More generally, both types of measures (stock-based and
accounting-based) contain information that is useful in drawing inferences
about the effectiveness of employee performance, but stock-based measures
are likely to prove far more "informative" with respect to senior
management performance than with respect to lower-level employees.20 As a
consequence, the implementation of an ESOP may exact a cost along the
incentive contracting dimension.
Weirton Steel's 100% employee-owned ESOP decided to take Weirton
public again after a successful revitalization of the company- Part of the
reason for the sale ofcompany stock was that many of the vested employees
in the ESOP did not want to risk undertaking a $500 million expansion of the
firm's steel-producing capacity. They preferred a safer position.21
It is interesting to note that employee stock ownership was quite
common in the 1920s (Patard, 1985). But due to the market crash begun in
1929, 90% of the stock ownership plans in place before the crash 'were
discontinued by the mid-1930s. Those not terminated restricted participation
exclusively to highly-paid employees. This evidence suggests that risk-
sharing considerations are very important.
The tax rules require that employers allow employees to diversify their
holdings at the later of age 55 and 10 years of employment. In the first four
years following the passage of this milestone, employees must be permitted to
diversify up to 25% of their holdings, and in the fifth year they can invest up
to 50% of their holdings in nonemployer securities.
If employees receive nontraded company stock when they retire or
leave the company, they have the right to put the stock back to the company
for cash. Depending on the demographics, it might be very costly for the
corporation to redeem these shares. Additional funds might have to be raised
at a time when it is very costly to do so. Moreover, the release of shares to the
employees of a private company might force the corporation to comply with
Securities and Exchange Commission reporting requirements.(The
threshold is 500 shareholders.) This is also costly.
20See Lainbert and Larcker (1987) for an analysis of stock-based versus accounting-based
measuresof performancein incentive contracting.
215usiness Week, January23,1989.
12Prior to the 1987 Tax Act, many ESOPsponsors provided their
employees with a defined-benefit pension plan offset. Examples include
Ashland Oil, Bank of New York, and Hartmarx.22 In thesearrangements, the
defined benefit plan might guarantee employees a retirementbenefit of say
50% of their terminal salary during eachyear of retirement, but distributions
to employees would be made from the defined benefitplan only if the ESOP
failed to provide at least that same level of benefits. Thedefined benefit
promise serves as a guaranteed floor. This reduces the employee's riskby essentially providing the employee with aputoption. Note that shielding
employees from risk also means sacrificing incentives. The 1987 Tax Act
restricted the use of these defined-benefit-offset provisions.
Firms have discovered other means to reduce theemployee's risk of
holding company stock in an ESOP. The ESOP can investup to 50% of its
assets in other than company stock.23 The ESOP can also besupplemented
with other types of compensatibn plans to reduce risk. Forexample, an ESOP
might be combined with another defined contribution plan investedentirely in bonds.
Many firms have started to fund the ESOP with convertiblevoting preferred stock.24 Holding preferred shares is generally lessrisky than
holding the company's common stock in the ESOP. Given itssuperior dividend yield, the preferred will tend to sell at apremium over the common
(if convertible into at least one share of common) and retainmore of its value
than the common stock if the value of thecompany should fall.If the
preferred issue represented a substantial majority of thecompany's stock, however, it would have little protection in the event that thecompany does
poorly.
Moreover, some ESOPs provide employees with aput option. That is, if the preferred stock happens to beselling below the conversion price when
the employee retires or leaves the firm, theemployee can put the stock back
to the company for the conversion price. Thisput option is valuable to
employees and protects them against the risk of a decline in theprice of the common stock.
In summary, an ESOP provides a pensionsavings alternative to more
conventional tax-qualified pension funds, one thatprovides employees with an ownership interest in the firm. Employeeownership might lead the
See Forbes (1986).
a comprehensive survey conducted by the U.S. General Accounting Office in1986, however,
four-fifths of ESOPs invested 75% or more of (heir assets insponsoring company stock.
240ur analysis of ESOP announcementsinthe first four months of 1989 from the Dow Jones New
Retrieval Service inthcates thatmore thanhalf of all new securities acquired by ESOPs are
employer convertible preferred stocks,
13firm's "productivity" to improve as employees' interests become better
aligned with the firm's other shareholders. But such compensation
arrangements may be at the expense of other more efficientforms (ignoring
taxes), both for risk-sharing and incentive reasons.
Moreover, there can be severe nontax costs if an ESOP must refinance
to repurchase shares from departing employees. Shares that are initially
contributed to the trust must eventually be cashed out, arid high transaction
costs might be incurred to accomplish this task.
With these nontax costs and benefits of establishing an ESOP in mind,
let us turn next to the tax benefits, We discuss primarily the tax advantages of
a leveraged ESOP and the tax-deductibility of dividends on ESOP shares.
Ill. A Closer Look at Tax Advantages of an ESOP
Prior to the 1986 Tax Act there were two basic types of ESOPs: a tax
deduction ESOP (where contributions to the trust give rise to tax deductions)
and a tax credit ESOP (where contributions to the trust give rise to tax credits).
The tax credit ESOP was eliminated with the 1986 Tax Act. The 1984 Tax Act
added significant tax incentives to encourage ESOPs. The 1984 Tax Act
provided that (1) shareholders in a closely-held company could obtain a tax-
free rollover on the sale of their shares to an ESOP if it attained at least 30%
ownership of the company and if the seller purchased qualified replacement
securities such as corporate bonds; (2) the corporation could receive •a
deduction for dividends paid on ESOP stock, provided that the dividends
were paid out currently to employees; and (3) a bank, insurance, company, or
other commercial lender was permitted to exclude from income 50% of the
interest received on loans to ESOP sponsors, provided that the proceeds of the
loan were used to finance the acquisition of employer stock for the ESOP.
The 1986 Tax Act added to these benefits. The 1986 Tax Act provided (1)
an estate tax exclusion for 50% of the proceeds of certain sales of company
stock to an ESOP; (2) an expansion of the corporate dividend deduction to
include dividends used to repay principal or interest on the loan used to
acquire employer securities; (3) a provision allowing mutual funds to be
added to the list of lenders eligible to receive the partial interest exclusion on
loans to acquire employer securities; and (4) an exemption from the 10%
excise tax on reversions from defined benefit pension plans that are
transferred to an ESOP before 1989. The Act repealed the payroll-based ESOP
tax credit and required that certain employees be allowed to diversify their
accounts.
14The Fifty Percent Interest Exclusion
Under Code Sec. 133, banks, insurance companies, or regulated
investment companies may exclude from gross income 50% of the interest
that they receive on a loan used to buy company stock for an ESOP. There are
three types of loans. These include (1) an immediate allocation loan, (2) a
leveraged-ESOP loan, and (3) a back-to-back leveraged-ESOP loan. An
immediate allocation loan is a loan to the company sponsoring the ESOP.
The other two loans are effectively loans to the ESOP itself.
In an immediate allocation loan, the company borrows an amount
equal to one-year's contribution to an ESOP and transfers qualifying employer
securities to the ESOP. The loan, including any period of refinancing, cannot
extend beyond a seven-year term. The transferred securities must be allocated
to the individual accounts of employees within one year of the date of the
loan (hence the term "immediate allocation").
The immediate allocation loan provides an opportunity for tax
arbitrage in appropriate circumstances. To illustrate this, note that if lending
markets are competitive and if there are no special costs associated with ESOP
loans, the risk-adjusted before-tax rate of return on the loan, RI, will be given
by the following relation:
Rj( I -.Stc)=Rb(1-tc)
or RI =R13(1tc)/(1
where tc = corporatemarginal tax rate;
Rb = thebefore-tax risk-adjusted return on fully-taxable bonds;
and
= therequired before-tax rate of return on the ESOP loan.
So if corporate marginal tax rates are 34%, this implies that the rate of
interest on the immediate allocation loan will be 79.5% of the fully-taxable
rate.25 Empirical evidence suggests that ESOP loan rates are set between 80%
25lnsurance companies are required to include 15% of anytax-exempt interest thatthey receive
in taxable income. As a result, the insurance company would require a rate ol interest that is
82% of the fully-taxable rate ( or R1 =.66Rbf(I-1.15x.Sx.34)).See Bader and Hourihan
(1989a). Mutual funds can create dual-class ownership, where one class receives the partially
tax-exempt interest and other shareholders receive Fully-taxable interest. As a result,
corporations with a 34% marginal tax rate or high marginal-tax-rate qualified noncorporate
taxpayers might be the marginal holders of the tax-exempt piece.
15and 90% of the fully-taxable rate, with securitized loans priced at roughly 75%
of the prime rate.26
Assume for the moment that the corporation already has an ESOP and
has determined the magnitude of this years required contribution of stock. If
the firm were to finance the contribution to the ESOP with an immediate
allocation loan, the corporation's after-tax interest cost would be Ri(1 -tc)or
approximately 80% of the after-tax cost of an ordinary loan for a 34%
corporation that captures most of the tax benefits of the 50% interest exclusion
via an interest rate reduction. If the corporation were otherwise planning to
repurchase its stock using its internal cash flow, it would be tax-advantageous
to use the proceeds of the immediate allocation loan to buy shares in the open
market to contribute to the ESOP and use its internal cash flow topay back
some company debt.
Moreover, if the company currently contributes stock to a defined
contribution pension plan other than an ESOP, it would be tax-advantageous
for the company to switch to an ESOP. The seven-year immediate allocation
loan is quite valuable. For example, if the before-tax bond rate is equal to 10%,
the immediate allocation loan would have a before-tax rate of interest of 8%
and an after-tax rate of interest of 5.28% (or 8%(1 -34%)).If the corporations
ordinary borrowing rate is 10%, its after-tax cost is 6.6%. The immediate
allocation loan offers an after-tax savings of 1.32%per year for a maximum of
seven years. The present value of this benefit at a discount rate of 6.6% is
7.3% of the principal amount of the loan.27
While the immediate allocation loan is a loan for only oneyear's
contribution to the ESOP, it is also possible for the ESOP to borrow toacquire stock that will fund the contributions to the pension fund formany years.
This is called a leveraged ESOP. The ESOP borrows enough such that the loan
proceeds can buy sufficient stock to fund, say, the next fifteen annual
contributions. As with immediate allocation loans, qualified lenderscan
26See Kaplan (1989), Merrill Lynch (1988), Shearmanand Sterling (1989), and Shacklelord
(1988).Caremustbe exercised in gathering evidenceon these rates.Because of the 50%
exclusion,it NY to set a high rate on an ESOI' loan and a lower rate on fully-taxable loans.
The tax laws impose restraints on this, but there is stiltroom to set rates opportunistically. To
test this, loans should be separated into two piles: those where the lender hasno other business
dealings with the buyer and those where the lender alsoengages in non-ESOl' transactions
with the borrower. Care must also be exercised to determine thecorrect risk adjustment to be
made in comparing interest rates across loans.
27The government also subsidizesany deadweight costs that are uniquely incurred to
underwrite the ESOP loan. The lender deducts its costs toprocess and underwrite the loan
while the borrower pays less than 100% of the these coststhrough the interest break. Further,
the 50% interest exclusionencourages the bundling of other services with the loan to secure a
50% Income exclusion on revenues generated from these other services.
16exclude from taxable income 50% of the interest received on the leveraged
ESOP loan.
If a leveraged ESO1' borrows and buys company stock, the stock is
placed in a so-called suspense account." Each year as the corporation makes
tax-deductible cash contributions to its ESOP, stock is released from the
suspense account and allocated to the accounts of the participants. The
contribution is then used to pay down the loan. The corporation can deduct
up to 25% of compensation each year, the same as for an unleveraged ESOP. It
also can deduct the interest payments that it contributes to the ESOP to pay
the interest on the £501' loan. Also any dividends that are paid on the stock
allocated to the participants or on the unallocated shares held in the suspense
account can be used to pay down the loan. These dividends are tax deductible
to the corporation.
It is often claimed that a leveraged ESOP is tax-advantageous because
the corporation can make tax-deductible principal repayments on its ESOP
loans. As we have already noted, however, all compensation payments are
tax-deductible to the corporation. However, the 50% exclusion of interest on
the loan and the deductibility of certain dividends are tax-advantageous.
These options are not available with other plans.
It is harder to quantify whether the corporation should use an
immediate allocation loan or a leveraged-ESOP structure. The term of the
leveraged-ESOP loan can extend for as many years as the company wishes to
precommit to contribute stock to its ESOP.28 It must, however, pay down the
ESOP loan uniformly over its life. The immediate allocation loan can only
extend for a period of seven years. But it can be a term loan in which all
principal is repaid at maturity. Each year the corporation can issue another
immediate allocation loan to fund that year's contribution to its ESOP.
Although a leveraged ESOP loan is initially a much larger loan than an
immediate allocation loan, the size of the loan falls each year as the principal
on the note is reduced.
Another advantage of immediate allocation loans over leveraged ESOP
loans is that where share prices are increasing over time, immediate
allocation loans yield larger tax deductions for a given cost of buying shares
deposited into the ESOP. The reason for this is that in a leveraged ESOP, tax
deductions are based on the value of the stock at the time the shares are first
acquired, whereas in the immediate allocation plan, the deductions are based
28Althoughthe term of the ESOI' debtislimited by the number of years to which the employer
will commit to making ESOP contributions, the maturity of the loan is restricted to ten years if
the employer uses the "principal method" of allocation to release shares from the suspense
account Generally, the proportional method is used, wherein shares are released from the
suspense account in proportion to interest and principal that is paid on the loan.
17Qfl: share prices at the time the shares are allocated to participant accounts.29
Depending on the length and size of the ESOP program, the present value of
the tax benefits could be greater with an immediate allocation loan than with
a leveraged-ESOP loan.
If future legislation were to limit the tax benefits of ESOP programs, the
long-term loan might prove more or less attractive than the immediate
allocation loan depending upon the particular "grandfather" provisions
included in the legislation. It is interesting to note that many of ESOP loans
are. written with provisions that guarantee the lender a benchmark after-tax
rate of return that floats with the return on a taxable loan of comparable risk
(e.g., Treasury bill plus some fixed number of basis points). The rate of
interest' on the loan changes if statutory tax rates change or if the percentage of
interest that is tax-exempt were to change. The corporation could be at a
definite disadvantage if Congress were to limit tax-deductible contributions to
defined contribution plans and, as a result, prevent the corporation from
making tax-deductible contributions to its pension plan of sufficient size to
pay down the loan.
The back-to-back loan is very similar to the leveraged ESOP loan. In
this case, the corporation borrows to purchase company stock and relends the
same amount to its ESOP. The ESOP buys the companys stock with the
proceeds. There are two separate loans, one from the qualifying institution to
the corporation, and one from the corporation to the ESOP trust. To qualify
for the same tax treatment as the leveraged-ESOP loan, the repayment
schedule and the interest rate must be essentially identical. If not, the back-to-
back loan is limited to a term of seven years. Moreover, leveraged-ESOP
loans cannot be accelerated in the case of a default. As a result, many lenders
prefer back-to-back loans. Also, the lender might feel more secure dealing
with a corporation than with a trusteed pension plan. A pension plan never
borrows except to finance a leveraged ESOP. The body of law concerning the
property rights of the parties to leveraged-ESOP transactions is not well
established.
The leveraged-ESOP structure has been used in a number of leveraged-
buyout transactions. It has also been used to accomplish such corporate
finance objectives as (1) implementing a share repurchase program, (2) selling
a division to employees, (3) placing a large block of the company's stock in
employee (friendly) hands, and (4) taking a company private. However, there
are several problems with this structure. The company must project future
employee contributions. Overestimating the required payments would cause
the employer to borrow an amount in excess of the actual annual
requirements. Prepaying this excess amount of debt would result in the
29See Freiman(1989) for amore extensiveanalysis ofthis issue.
18allocation of shares to the participants accounts. Employees could benefit at
the expense of the other shareholders.
The Deduction of Dividend Payments
Under Code Sec. 404(k), the corporation can deduct dividends to an
ESOP if (1) the dividends are paid in cash directly to ESOP participants, (2) the
dividends are paid to the ESOP and it distributes them to participants within
90 days of the close of the plan year, or (3) the dividends on ESOP stock
(whether in the suspense account or allocated to participants) are used to
make payments on an ESOP loan as described in Code Sec. 404(a)(9). The
ability to take a deduction for dividends used to make payments on an ESOP
loan was introduced by the 1986 Tax Act.
The deductibility of dividends eliminates the entity-level tax on part of
the corporate income. In the extreme, if all the shares of a corporation were
owned by its employees, and the corporation paid out tax-deductible
dividends equal to its pre-dividend taxable income, all of the corporation's
income would be taxed only once at the individual shareholder level. It is
not entirely clear, however, that this should be taken too literally. The 1984
Act contained a provision empowering the Treasury to disallow dividend
deductions to the extent they are deemed to "contribute to tax avoidance."
Presumably this would be invoked if profitable businesses sought to distribute
all profits as tax-deductible dividends. On the other hand, the provision may
simply be a "paper tiger"
To see that dividends which are deductible to the corporation and paid
on ESOP shares to participants convert the corporate tax to a single level of
taxation under most circumstances, assume that the corporation is currently
contributing $10 million to an ESOP at the end of each year. Further assume
that this is less than the maximum contribution permitted of 25% of
compensation.30 Assume that the employer pays a dividend of $3 million at
year end on the ESOP shares and that this dividend is paid directly to the
participants. Now suppose the corporation alters its policy by contributing $13
million to the ESOP instead of the usual $10 million and by reducing
employee salary by $3 million. As a result, while salary is reduced by $3
million, employees receive $3 million in dividends from the ESOP.
Employee pension accounts grow in value by the return on the pension assets
less $3 million distributed as a dividend, but the corporation contributes an
additional $3 million to the ESOP. So the accumulation in employee ESOP
accounts, as well as their current compensation (salary plus dividends), is
unaffected by this change in policy. From the corporation's viewpoint, the
before-tax cash outflows are also exactly the same whether the corporation
30As discussed earlier, very few plans actually face binding constraints on the contribution
limit. This is particularly so for public companies.
19contributes to a qualified stock-bonus plan and pays a dividend on these
shares or it contributes to an ESOP.
For example, assume that employee salaries, before the ESOP plan was
adopted, totaled $50 million, If $10 million was also contributed to a stock
bonus plan and $3 million in dividends were paid, the total pretax cash
outflows would be $63 million. Under the ESOP plan, with dividends paid
currently to employees, cash outflows would be $47 million in salary, $13
million in contribution to the ESOP, and $3 million in dividends on the
ESOP shares. The total of $63 million is exactly the same as if the corporation
contributed to a stock-bonus plan. After tax, however, the corporation is
better off because it secures a tax deduction for $3 million of dividends. So if
corpprate tax rates are 34%, the corporation can eliminate just over $1 million
in tax per year from the dividends paid to employees through securities that
they hold in their ESOP accounts.31 In effect, as employees accumulate
securities in their ESOP accounts, they receive tax-deductible dividends from
the corporation that convert income that would have been taxed at the
corporate level, and then again at the personal level, to income that is taxed
only once at the personal level.
Notice, however, that this plan works only if employees are not up
against the 25%-of-compensation contribution limits.If the corporation is
already funding contributions to an ESOP to the maximum allowed under
the tax rules, it could not increase its funding and reduce current
compensation as assumed in the analysis above unless a leveraged ESOP
structure is used and dividends are used to pay down ESOP loans.
Corporate deductions can also be secured when dividends are used to
make payments on an ESOP loan. But, contrary to popular belief, there is no
tax advantage to using dividends to make payments on a leveraged loan. To
see this, note that to secure a tax deduction for the dividends, participants
must be allocated shares in the ESOP equal in dollar value to the dividends
used to pay down the loan. Since employees are allocated shares equal to
their share of the dividends, the firm should be able to cut back other pension
contributions in the same amount, leaving employees unaffected. As a
result, the corporation's taxable income is also unaffected, so the deductibility
of dividends does not reduce the corporate-level tax in this case.
The one case in which dividend deductibility on ESOP loans is
advantageous is where employees want to add to their pension savings
beyond the 25%-of-compensation limits. They are permitted to exceed the
limits by using dividends to makepayments on the ESOP loan. On the other
hand, except in small, privately-held corporations, it isvery uncommon that
31Moreover, the firm and certain employees can avoidpaying some social security taxes on
their reduced salary.
20employees wish to invest so heavily in pension savings, especially in a plan
that is so poorly diversified:
ESOPs Financed with Equity Providing Dividend Pass-through versus
Debt-financed Pension Plans Investing in Debt Securities
In the preceding discussion, we demonstrated that if for nontax reasons
employee stock were held in the pension fund, an ESOP could profitably be
used to effect tax savings. In this section we demonstrate that, ignoring the
advantage of the 50% interest exemption on qualified ESOP loans, as well as
other less important special tax featUres, ESOPs are really dominated by other
pension funds that avoid investing in employer equity securities. We further
argue that in many relevant cases, the interest rate subsidy resulting from the
50% exclusion of interest income roughly compensates for the tax
disadvantage of ESOPs. So, in the end, whether ESOPs are desirable,
particularly for publicly-traded companies, depends largely on the nontax
benefits of employee ownership of employer shares.
To establish that ESOPs with dividend pass-through to employees are
weakly dominated by debt-financed defined contribution pension plans, -we
proceed in stages. We begin by analyzing the after-tax cash flows to employees
and employers when $1 is contributed into a pension plan, financed by debt
bearing interest at rate Rb. The pension plan in turn invests in interest-
bearing securities yielding rate Rb per year. The tax rates of the employer and
the employee are tc and tp, respectively.
Case I: Debt-financed Pension Fund
Time Period
Today Annually Through At Retirement
(time 0) Retirement (n years)
Cash Flow to:
Employer +tc -Rb(1-tc) -1
Employee 0 0
At time 0, the employer borrows $1 and deposits it into the pension
plan, a net cash flow of $0. A tax deduction of $1 for the contribution to the
pension fund, however, yields a tax savings of tc for the employer, so total
cash flow is +tc. Each year thereafter, through retirement, the employer pays
out interest of Rb, which is tax deductible at rate tc. Finally, at retirement, in
n years, the employer repays the $1 principal amount of the loan and the
21employee cashes out the pension. By this time,the pension assets have
grown in value to (1 +RbP',and the employee is taxed on this amount at rate
tp.
Next, compare these cash flows to those that result from the employer
forming an ESOP, financing the $1 contribution tothe trust with a preferred
stock paying a dividend of Rb per period. Dividends are reinvested in the
trust rather than paid out each year to the employee.
Case II: Preferred Stock-financed ESOP with Dividends Reinvested
in the Pension Plan
Time Period
Today Annually Through At REtirement
(time 0) Retirement (n years)
Cash flow to:
Employer +tc -Rb -1
Employee 0 0 +(1+RbY'(l-tp)
Except for the annual cash outflow for the employer to service the
security issued to fund the pension plan, cash flows are identical to those for
the debt-financed pension fund. Here, however, the dividend payments are
nondeductible, so while the employee is indifferent across the alternatives,
the employer is worse off by Rbtc per period. Note that Rbtc is simply the tax
shield from interest deductibility available in Case I but not Case II.
Finally, consider the case of an ESOP financed with employer preferred
stock, but where these dividends are paid out to the employee each period.
Case HI: Preferred Stock-financed ESOP with Dividends Passed Throuth to
Employees
Time Period
Today Annually Trough At Retirement
(time 0) Retirement (n years)
Cash Flow to:
Employer +tc -Rb(1-tc) -1
Employee 0 +Rb(14p) +l-tp
22Note that while the cash flows to the employer in this case coincide
with those in Case I (debt-financed pension plan), those for theemployee are
not directly comparable since both interim and terminal cash flowsare
different. To make them comparable, suppose the employer reduces the
employees salary by Rb per period, contributing this amount to a non-ESOP
pension plan that earns interest at rate Rb per period. In this case, the interim
cash flows to the employee will be $0, just as in Case I.
To see how the ESOP with dividend pass-throughcompares with a
debt-financed pension, then, we need only compare the terminal after-tax
cash flow to the employee in this case with that in Case I (since all other cash
flows to both parties now coincide). The supplementary pension plan for the
employee accumulates to the future value of an annuity of Rb dollars for n
periods with interest at rate Rb per period. This is equal to:
Rb[(1+Rb)fl-1J/Rbor(l+Rb)n1.
Thisis fully taxable at rate tp. so the after-tax amount is:
(1+Rb)n (it) -(l4p).
We can now add this supplementary pension amount to the I -tpavailable
from the ESOP, and we are left with
(1+R&n (ltp).
This is exactly the same terminal amount the employee receives in Case I, the
debt-financed pension plan.
While a comparison of Cases I and III makes it appear as though the
ESOP (with dividend pass-through) is equivalent to the debt-financed non-
ESOP pension plan, this is only because we have allowed the ESOP to invest
in preferred shares that have no equity-like features to them. That is, the
dividend yield is the full interest rate, and there is no capital gain component
to it. But in fact, the ESOP assets must be invested primarily (that is, at least
50%) in employer common stock or convertible preferred stock, and these
securities almost always have an expected capital appreciation component.32
32The preferred stock must be convertible into the common stock of thecompany at a
nreasonable conversion price, which has not yet been clearly defined. The firm must not be
permitted to call the preferred, or if it can, the preferredmust be convertible prior to the call.
it must be convertible into a readily tradeable stock if traded on a securities market. If no such
stock exists, the preferred must be convertible into the issue that contains the most voting and
dividend rights among all outstanding shares. This last condition might be difficult to satisfy
in certain cases. For example, if an ESOP is formed in conjunction with a leveraged buyout, the
23Case II can be viewed as a case in which the ESOP is financed with
nondividend-paying common stock. The interim cash outflow of Rb can be
interpreted as the non-deductible sinking fund contribution required to cover
the appreciation in the share of stock that the employer will have to
repurchase from the employee at time n.
More typically, the employer securities contributed to the ESOF will
have a dividend yield somewhere in between those for Cases II and Ill. In
such circumstances, the employer will be worse off, relative to a non-ESOP
pension plan, by the value of a tax deduction on the difference between the
current yield on the ESOP securities and the interest rate on debt. In this
light, one might view the availability of the tax exemption to qualified ESOP
lenders of half the interest income on ESOP loans as a way of neutralizing
the disadvantage demonstrated above. The analysis also helps to explain why
high dividend-yielding convertible preferred stocks have become so popular
as an investment in ESOPs.33
If the 50% interest income exemption roughly compensates for the
reduced deductibility of the employer cost to service the securities issued to
fund the ESOP, then the differences between ESOPs and other pension plans
becomes restricted largely to the nontax dimension. In particular, with more
employer securities in the ESOP, work incentives are clearly affected, and
voting control is clearly enhanced, thereby providing a superior takeover
defense (or more pejoratively, enhanced management entrenchment).
IV. Evidence on the Growing Importance of ESOPs in the U.S. Economy
It is unfortunate that the most complete survey available of the
prominent features of ESOPs goes only through 1984.TheDeficit Reduction
Act of 1984 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 had dramatic effects on incentives
to utilize these trusts to take advantage of the tax-favored leveraging
opportunities and dividend deductibility.Table 2 reveals that at
structure of the!everaged buyout might be such that it is difficultto know which securityhas
the greatest voting and dividend rights.
33Other reasons for the popularity of high dividend-yielding convertible preferred stock
include (1) reduced investment risk for employees, although this presumably comes at the
expense of reduced incentives, and (2) leveraging of voting-rights in presumably friendly hands
(a defense weapon).
34lJnited States General Accounting Office (1986).
24Table 2 Growth in the Number of ESOP Plans and Number of Employees
Covered









aSource: National Center for Employee Ownership (Oakland, CA)
bNote that this exceeds 10% of the nation's labor force.
year-end 1988, there were 9500 ESOPs in existence covering 9.5 million
workers. The number of new plans established in 1985 and 1986 (591 per year)
was 19% higher than the average over the six years ending in 1984. And the
number of new plans established in 1987 and 1988 (727 per year) was 27%
higher than 1985 and 1986. Moreover, an estimated 500 additional plans were
established in the first four months of 1989 alone.
The U.S. General Accounting Office estimates that of the 6904 ESOPs at
year-end 1984, only 4174 were still active. Approximately 90% of these plans
were tax-credit ESOPs. Total assets in ESOPs at year-end 1984 were $19 billion,
of which $15 billion were in tax-credit ESOPs ($2,300 per covered employee)
and $4 billion were in other ESOPs ($5,700 per covered employee).
Although it was the 1984 Tax Act that introduced the interest income
exemption for qualified ESOP loans and deductibility of dividends paid out to
employees, ESOP activity accelerated more quickly following the 1986 Act.
The 1986 Act contained a number of ESOP and non-ESOP provisions that
affected the desirability of ESOPs, to which we alluded earlier.
Since 1986, leveraged ESOPs in particular have exploded in economic
significance. According to the National Center for Employer Ownership, new
ESOP borrowings grew from $1.2 billion in 1986 to $5.5 billion in 1987 and $6.4
billion in 1988. In addition, based on our analysis of disclosures available
25through the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service, plans to undertake more
than $9 billion of ESOP borrowings were announcedduring 1989 through
May 10 alone!35 It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that on June 6, 1989,
Dan Rostenkowski, as chairman of the House Ways and MeansCommittee,
introduced legislation to repeal the 50% interest exemptionon ESOP loans.
While this proposal is prompted by concerns over revenue lossesto the U.S.
Treasury, our analysis suggests that this concern may be misplaced. We have
argued that takeover defense considerations are likely to have dominated. It
is interesting to note that another batch of new ESOPswere hurriedly
introduced by dozens of companies following the Rostenkowskiproposal in an attempt to beat the new effective date forany adverse tax changes that
might result from the passage of legislation.36
Summary
An ESOP is an interesting organizational vehicle. Its mainadvantages over other forms of compensation are that it allows thecorporation to obtain
a below-market-rate-of-interest loan and that dividends oncommon stock are
tax deductible if they are paid to ESOPparticipants. In the limit (100%
employee ownership), the corporate tax theoretically can be eliminated,
although asa practical matter, gutting the corporate tax is impossibleeven
with 100% employee ownership. Anddepending upon the circumstances,
another great cost or benefit is its effectivenessas a defensive weapon. This is
a cost when entrenchment allows existingmanagement to secure private gain
at the expense of shareholders and whena transfer of control over
managerial decision rights to a more efficientgroup is prevented. It is a
benefit, however, to the extent such protection froman outside bid promotes
investment by employees in firm-specificcapital that improves employee
performance. Another important disadvantage ofan ESOP is possible
distortions in incentive compensationarrangements.
As if so often the case in publicpolicy debates, the analysis to date of tax
and nontax factors in the use of ESOPs has failedto consider the alternative
institutional arrangements that aredisplaced by ESOPs. We have attempted
to repair that omission here, and inso doing, we find ESOPs lacking in magic for their corporatesponsors along both tax and incentive dimensions, except
perhaps in closely-held businesses. With these usualsuspects rounded up, we are left with the creation of impediments tochanges in corporate control as the prime motivation for ESOPs.
Wearegratefulto Karen Wruck for assistance in securing these announcement data.
36PensionsandInvestment AgeMagazine,July 24, 1989.
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